The
utility imprisons a process and all future descendants.
The options are as follows:
-i
Output the jail identifier of the newly created jail.
-J jid_file
Write a
jid_file
file, containing jail identifier, path, hostname, IP and
command used to start the jail.
-l
Run program in the clean environment.
The environment is discarded except for
HOME , SHELL , TERM
and
USERHOME
and
SHELL
are set to the target login's default values.
USER
is set to the target login.
TERM
is imported from the current environment.
The environment variables from the login class capability database for the
target login are also set.
-s securelevel
Sets the
kern.securelevel
sysctl variable to the specified value inside the newly created jail.
-u username
The user name from host environment as whom the
command
should run.
-U username
The user name from jailed environment as whom the
command
should run.
path
Directory which is to be the root of the prison.
hostname
Hostname of the prison.
ip-number
IP number assigned to the prison.
command
Pathname of the program which is to be executed.
Jails are typically set up using one of two philosophies: either to
constrain a specific application (possibly running with privilege), or
to create a
``virtual system image''
running a variety of daemons and services.
In both cases, a fairly complete file system install of
Fx is
required, so as to provide the necessary command line tools, daemons,
libraries, application configuration files, etc.
However, for a virtual server configuration, a fair amount of
additional work is required so as to configure the
``boot''
process.
This manual page documents the configuration steps necessary to support
either of these steps, although the configuration steps may be
refined based on local requirements.
Please see the
jail(2)
man page for further details.
EXAMPLES
Setting up a Jail Directory Tree
To set up a jail directory tree containing an entire
Fx distribution, the following
sh(1)
command script can be used:
D=/here/is/the/jail
cd /usr/src
mkdir -p $D
make world DESTDIR=$D
make distribution DESTDIR=$D
mount -t devfs devfs $D/dev
NOTE: It is important that only appropriate device nodes in devfs be
exposed to a jail; access to disk devices in the jail may permit processes
in the jail to bypass the jail sandboxing by modifying files outside of
the jail.
See
devfs(8)
for information on how to use devfs rules to limit access to entries
in the per-jail devfs.
A simple devfs ruleset for jails is available as ruleset #4 in
/etc/defaults/devfs.rules
In many cases this example would put far more in the jail than needed.
In the other extreme case a jail might contain only one file:
the executable to be run in the jail.
We recommend experimentation and caution that it is a lot easier to
start with a
``fat''
jail and remove things until it stops working,
than it is to start with a
``thin''
jail and add things until it works.
Setting Up a Jail
Do what was described in
Sx Setting Up a Jail Directory Tree
to build the jail directory tree.
For the sake of this example, we will
assume you built it in
/data/jail/192.0.2.100
named for the jailed IP address.
Substitute below as needed with your
own directory, IP address, and hostname.
Setting up the Host Environment
First, you will want to set up your real system's environment to be
``jail-friendly''
For consistency, we will refer to the parent box as the
``host environment''
and to the jailed virtual machine as the
``jail environment''
Since jail is implemented using IP aliases, one of the first things to do
is to disable IP services on the host system that listen on all local
IP addresses for a service.
If a network service is present in the host environment that binds all
available IP addresses rather than specific IP addresses, it may service
requests sent to jail IP addresses.
This means changing
inetd(8)
to only listen on the
appropriate IP address, and so forth.
Add the following to
/etc/rc.conf
in the host environment:
sendmail_enable="NO"
inetd_flags="-wW -a 192.0.2.23"
rpcbind_enable="NO"
192.0.2.23
is the native IP address for the host system, in this example.
Daemons that run out of
inetd(8)
can be easily set to use only the specified host IP address.
Other daemons
will need to be manually configured---for some this is possible through
the
rc.conf5
flags entries; for others it is necessary to modify per-application
configuration files, or to recompile the applications.
The following frequently deployed services must have their individual
configuration files modified to limit the application to listening
to a specific IP address:
To configure
sshd(8),
it is necessary to modify
/etc/ssh/sshd_config
To configure
sendmail(8),
it is necessary to modify
/etc/mail/sendmail.cf
For
named(8),
it is necessary to modify
/etc/namedb/named.conf
In addition, a number of services must be recompiled in order to run
them in the host environment.
This includes most applications providing services using
rpc(3),
such as
rpcbind(8),
nfsd(8),
and
mountd(8).
In general, applications for which it is not possible to specify which
IP address to bind should not be run in the host environment unless they
should also service requests sent to jail IP addresses.
Attempting to serve
NFS from the host environment may also cause confusion, and cannot be
easily reconfigured to use only specific IPs, as some NFS services are
hosted directly from the kernel.
Any third-party network software running
in the host environment should also be checked and configured so that it
does not bind all IP addresses, which would result in those services' also
appearing to be offered by the jail environments.
Once
these daemons have been disabled or fixed in the host environment, it is
best to reboot so that all daemons are in a known state, to reduce the
potential for confusion later (such as finding that when you send mail
to a jail, and its sendmail is down, the mail is delivered to the host,
etc.).
Configuring the Jail
Start any jail for the first time without configuring the network
interface so that you can clean it up a little and set up accounts.
As
with any machine (virtual or not) you will need to set a root password, time
zone, etc.
Some of these steps apply only if you intend to run a full virtual server
inside the jail; others apply both for constraining a particular application
or for running a virtual server.
Assuming no errors, you will end up with a shell prompt within the jail.
You can now run
/usr/sbin/sysinstall
and do the post-install configuration to set various configuration options,
or perform these actions manually by editing
/etc/rc.conf
etc.
Create an empty
/etc/fstab
to quell startup warnings about missing fstab (virtual server only)
Disable the port mapper
( /etc/rc.conf
rpcbind_enable=NO
(virtual server only)
Configure
/etc/resolv.conf
so that name resolution within the jail will work correctly
Disable interface configuration to quell startup warnings about
ifconfig(8)
(network_interfaces=
)
(virtual server only)
Set a root password, probably different from the real host system
Set the timezone
Add accounts for users in the jail environment
Install any packages the environment requires
You may also want to perform any package-specific configuration (web servers,
SSH servers, etc), patch up
/etc/syslog.conf
so it logs as you would like, etc.
If you are not using a virtual server, you may wish to modify
syslogd(8)
in the host environment to listen on the syslog socket in the jail
environment; in this example, the syslog socket would be stored in
/data/jail/192.0.2.100/var/run/log
Exit from the shell, and the jail will be shut down.
Starting the Jail
You are now ready to restart the jail and bring up the environment with
all of its daemons and other programs.
If you are running a single application in the jail, substitute the
command used to start the application for
/etc/rc
in the examples below.
To start a virtual server environment,
/etc/rc
is run to launch various daemons and services.
To do this, first bring up the
virtual host interface, and then start the jail's
/etc/rc
script from within the jail.
NOTE: If you plan to allow untrusted users to have root access inside the
jail, you may wish to consider setting the
security.jail.set_hostname_allowed
sysctl variable to 0.
Please see the management discussion later in this document as to why this
may be a good idea.
If you do decide to set this variable,
it must be set before starting any jails, and once each boot.
ifconfig ed0 inet alias 192.0.2.100/32
mount -t procfs proc /data/jail/192.0.2.100/proc
jail /data/jail/192.0.2.100 testhostname 192.0.2.100 \
/bin/sh /etc/rc
A few warnings will be produced, because most
sysctl(8)
configuration variables cannot be set from within the jail, as they are
global across all jails and the host environment.
However, it should all
work properly.
You should be able to see
inetd(8),
syslogd(8),
and other processes running within the jail using
ps(1),
with the
`J'
flag appearing beside jailed processes.
To see an active list of jails, use the
jls(8)
utility.
You should also be able to
telnet(1)
to the hostname or IP address of the jailed environment, and log
in using the accounts you created previously.
It is possible to have jails started at boot time.
Please refer to the
``jail_*''
variables in
rc.conf5
for more information.
The
rc(8)
jail script provides a flexible system to start/stop jails:
Normal machine shutdown commands, such as
halt(8),
reboot(8),
and
shutdown(8),
cannot be used successfully within the jail.
To kill all processes in a
jail, you may log into the jail and, as root, use one of the following
commands, depending on what you want to accomplish:
kill -TERM -1
kill -KILL -1
This will send the
SIGTERM
or
SIGKILL
signals to all processes in the jail from within the jail.
Depending on
the intended use of the jail, you may also want to run
/etc/rc.shutdown
from within the jail.
To kill processes from outside the jail, use the
jexec(8)
utility in conjunction with the one of the
kill(1)
commands above.
The
/proc/ pid /status
file contains, as its last field, the hostname of the jail in which the
process runs, or
``-
''
to indicate that the process is not running within a jail.
The
ps(1)
command also shows a
`J'
flag for processes in a jail.
However, the hostname for a jail may be, by
default, modified from within the jail, so the
/proc
status entry is unreliable by default.
To disable the setting of the hostname
from within a jail, set the
security.jail.set_hostname_allowed
sysctl variable in the host environment to 0, which will affect all jails.
You can have this sysctl set on each boot using
sysctl.conf5.
Just add the following line to
/etc/sysctl.conf
security.jail.set_hostname_allowed=0
You can also list/kill processes based on their jail ID.
To show processes and their jail ID, use the following command:
"ps ax -o pid,jid,args"
To show and then kill processes in jail number 3 use the following commands:
pgrep -lfj 3
pkill -j 3
or:
"killall -j 3"
Sysctl MIB Entries
Certain aspects of the jail containments environment may be modified from
the host environment using
sysctl(8)
MIB variables.
Currently, these variables affect all jails on the system, although in
the future this functionality may be finer grained.
security.jail.allow_raw_sockets
This MIB entry determines whether or not prison root is allowed to
create raw sockets.
Setting this MIB to 1 allows utilities like
ping(8)
and
traceroute(8)
to operate inside the prison.
If this MIB
is set, the source IP addresses are enforced to comply
with the IP address bound to the jail, regardless of whether or not
the
IP_HDRINCL
flag has been set on the socket.
Since raw sockets can be used to configure
and interact with various network subsystems, extra caution should be used
where privileged access to jails is given out to untrusted parties.
As such,
by default this option is disabled.
security.jail.enforce_statfs
This MIB entry determines which information processes in a jail are
able to get about mount-points.
It affects the behaviour of the following syscalls:
statfs(2),
fstatfs(2),
getfsstat(2)
and
fhstatfs(2)
(as well as similar compatibility syscalls).
When set to 0, all mount-points are available without any restrictions.
When set to 1, only mount-points below the jail's chroot directory are
visible.
In addition to that, the path to the jail's chroot directory is removed
from the front of their pathnames.
When set to 2 (default), above syscalls can operate only on a mount-point
where the jail's chroot directory is located.
security.jail.set_hostname_allowed
This MIB entry determines whether or not processes within a jail are
allowed to change their hostname via
hostname(1)
or
sethostname(3).
In the current jail implementation, the ability to set the hostname from
within the jail can impact management tools relying on the accuracy of jail
information in
/proc
As such, this should be disabled in environments where privileged access to
jails is given out to untrusted parties.
security.jail.socket_unixiproute_only
The jail functionality binds an IPv4 address to each jail, and limits
access to other network addresses in the IPv4 space that may be available
in the host environment.
However, jail is not currently able to limit access to other network
protocol stacks that have not had jail functionality added to them.
As such, by default, processes within jails may only access protocols
in the following domains:
PF_LOCAL , PF_INET
and
PF_ROUTE
permitting them access to
UNIX
domain sockets,
IPv4 addresses, and routing sockets.
To enable access to other domains, this MIB variable may be set to
0.
security.jail.sysvipc_allowed
This MIB entry determines whether or not processes within a jail have access
to System V IPC primitives.
In the current jail implementation, System V primitives share a single
namespace across the host and jail environments, meaning that processes
within a jail would be able to communicate with (and potentially interfere
with) processes outside of the jail, and in other jails.
As such, this functionality is disabled by default, but can be enabled
by setting this MIB entry to 1.
security.jail.chflags_allowed
This MIB entry determines how a privileged user inside a jail will be
treated by
chflags(2).
If zero, such users are treated as unprivileged, and are unable to set
or clear system file flags; if non-zero, such users are treated as
privileged, and may manipulate system file flags subject to the usual
constraints on
kern.securelevel
security.jail.mount_allowed
This MIB entry determines if a privileged user inside a jail will be
able to mount and unmount file system types marked as jail-friendly.
The
lsvfs(1)
command can be used to find file system types available for mount from within
a jail.
This functionality is disabled by default, but can be enabled by setting this
MIB entry to 1.
The read-only sysctl variable
security.jail.jailed
can be used to determine if a process is running inside a jail (value
is one) or not (value is zero).
The
security.jail.list
MIB entry is read-only and it returns an array of
Vt struct xprison
defined in
In sys/jail.h .
It is recommended to use the
jls(8)
utility to see current active list of jails.
There are currently two MIB related variables that have per-jail settings.
Changes to these variables by a jailed process do not effect the host
environment, only the jail environment.
The variables are
kern.securelevel
and
kern.hostname
An -nosplit
The jail feature was written by
An Poul-Henning Kamp
for R&D Associates
http://www.rndassociates.com/
who contributed it to
Fx .
An Robert Watson
wrote the extended documentation, found a few bugs, added
a few new features, and cleaned up the userland jail environment.
BUGS
Jail currently lacks the ability to allow access to
specific jail information via
ps(1)
as opposed to
procfs(5).
Similarly, it might be a good idea to add an
address alias flag such that daemons listening on all IPs
(INADDR_ANY
)
will not bind on that address, which would facilitate building a safe
host environment such that host daemons do not impose on services offered
from within jails.
Currently, the simplest answer is to minimize services
offered on the host, possibly limiting it to services offered from
inetd(8)
which is easily configurable.
