Ключевые слова:security, linux, (найти похожие документы) Subject: [Phrack] Linux Trusted Path Execution Redux
---[ Phrack Magazine Volume 8, Issue 53 July 8, 1998, article 08 of 15
-------------------------[ Linux Trusted Path Execution Redux
--------[ Krzysztof G. Baranowski <kgb@manjak.knm.org.pl>
---[ Introduction
The idea of trusted path execution is good, however the implementation which
appeared in Phrack 52-06 may be a major annoyance even to the root itself, eg.
old good INN newsserver keeps most of its control scripts in directories owned
by news, so it would be not possible to run them, when the original TPE patch
was applied. The better solution would be to have some kind of access list
where one could add and delete users allowed to run programs. This can be
very easily achieved, all you have to do is to write a kernel device driver,
which would allow you to control the access list from userspace by using
ioctl() syscalls.
---[ Implementation
The whole implementation consists of a kernel patch and an userspace program.
The patch adds a new driver to the kernel source tree and performs a few minor
modifications. The driver registers itself as a character device called "tpe",
with a major number of 40, so in /dev you must create a char device "tpe" with
major number of 40 and a minor number of 0 (mknod /dev/tpe c 40 0). The most
important parts of the driver are:
a) access list of non-root users allowed to run arbitrary programs
(empty by default, MAX_USERS can be increased in
include/linux/tpe.h),
b) tpe_verify() function, which checks whether a user should be
allowed to run the program and optionally logs TPE violation
attempts. The check if should we use tpe_verify() is done before
the program will be executed in fs/exec.c. If user is not root
we perform two checks and allow execution only in two cases:
1) if the directory is owned by root and is not group or
world writable (this check covers binaries located
in /bin, /usr/bin, /usr/local/bin/, etc...).
2) If the above check fails, we allow to run the program
only if the user is on our access list, and the program
is located in a directory owned by that user, which
is not group or world writable.
All other binaries are considered untrusted and will not be allowed
to run. The logging of TPE violation attempts is a sysctl option
(disabled by default). You can control it via /proc filesystem:
echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/tpe
will enable the logging:
echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/tpe
will turn it off. All these messages are logged at KERN_ALERT
priority.
c) tpe_ioctl() function, is our gate to/from the userspace. The
driver supports three ioctls:
1) TPE_SCSETENT - add UID to the access list,
2) TPE_SCDELENT - delete UID from the access list,
3) TPE_SCGETENT - get entry from the access list.
Only root is allowed to perform these ioctl()s.
The userspace program called "tpadm" is very simple. It opens /dev/tpe and
performs an ioctl() with arguments as given by user.
---[ In Conclusion
Well, that's all. Except for the legal blurb [1]:
"As usual, there are two main things to consider:
1. You get what you pay for.
2. It is free.
The consequences are that I won't guarantee the correctness of this document,
and if you come to me complaining about how you screwed up your system because
of wrong documentation, I won't feel sorry for you. I might even laugh at you.
But of course, if you _do_ manage to screw up your system using this I'd like
to hear of it. Not only to have a great laugh, but also to make sure that
you're the last RTFMing person to screw up.
In short, e-mail your suggestions, corrections and / or horror stories to
<kgb@manjak.knm.org.pl>."
Krzysztof G. Baranowski - President of the Harmless Manyacs' Club
http://www.knm.org.pl/ <prezes@manjak.knm.org.pl>
--
[1] My favorite one, taken from Linux kernel Documentation/sysctl/README,
written by Rik van Riel <H.H.vanRiel@fys.ruu.nl>.
----[ The code
<++> EX/tpe-0.02/Makefile
#
# Makefile for the Linux TPE Suite.
# Copyright (C) 1998 Krzysztof G. Baranowski. All rights reserved.
#
# Change this to suit your requirements
CC = gcc
CFLAGS = -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes -g -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer \
-pipe -m386
all: tpadm patch
tpadm: tpadm.c
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o tpadm tpadm.c
@strip tpadm
patch:
@echo
@echo "You must patch, reconfigure, recompile your kernel"
@echo "and create /dev/tpe (character, major 40, minor 0)"
@echo
clean:
rm -f *.o core tpadm
<-->
<++> EX/tpe-0.02/tpeadm.c
/*
* tpe.c - tpe administrator
*
* Copyright (C) 1998 Krzysztof G. Baranowski. All rights reserved.
*
* This file is part of the Linux TPE Suite and is made available under
* the terms of the GNU General Public License, version 2, or at your
* option, any later version, incorporated herein by reference.
*
*
* Revision history:
*
* Revision 0.01: Thu Apr 6 20:27:33 CEST 1998
* Initial release for alpha testing.
* Revision 0.02: Sat Apr 11 21:58:06 CEST 1998
* Minor cosmetic fixes.
*
*/
static const char *version = "0.02";
#include <linux/tpe.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pwd.h>
void banner(void)
{
fprintf(stdout, "TPE Administrator, version %s\n", version);
fprintf(stdout, "Copyright (C) 1998 Krzysztof G. Baranowski. "
"All rights reserved.\n");
fprintf(stdout, "Report bugs to <kgb@manjak.knm.org.pl>\n");
}
void usage(const char *name)
{
banner();
fprintf(stdout, "\nUsage:\n\t%s command\n", name);
fprintf(stdout, "\nCommands:\n"
" -a username\t\tadd username to the access list\n"
" -d username\t\tdelete username from the access list\n"
" -s\t\t\tshow access list\n"
" -h\t\t\tshow help\n"
" -v\t\t\tshow version\n");
}
void print_pwd(int pid)
{
struct passwd *pwd;
pwd = getpwuid(pid);
if (pwd != NULL)
fprintf(stdout, " %d\t%s\t %s \n",
pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_name, pwd->pw_gecos);
}
void print_entries(int fd)
{
int uid, i = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n UID\tName\t Gecos \n");
fprintf(stdout, "-------------------------\n");
while (i < MAX_USERS) {
uid = ioctl(fd, TPE_SCGETENT, i);
if (uid > 0)
print_pwd(uid);
i++;
}
fprintf(stdout, "\n");
}
int name2uid(const char *name)
{
struct passwd *pwd;
pwd = getpwnam(name);
if (pwd != NULL)
return pwd->pw_uid;
else {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: no such user.\n", name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
int add_entry(int fd, int uid)
{
int ret;
errno = 0;
ret = ioctl(fd, TPE_SCSETENT, uid);
if (ret < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't add entry: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
return 0;
}
int del_entry(int fd, int uid)
{
int ret;
errno = 0;
ret = ioctl(fd, TPE_SCDELENT, uid);
if (ret < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't delete entry: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
const char *name = "/dev/tpe";
char *add_arg = NULL;
char *del_arg = NULL;
int fd, c;
errno = 0;
if (argc <= 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: no command specified\n", argv[0]);
fprintf(stderr, "Try `%s -h' for more information\n", argv[0]);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
fd = open(name, O_RDWR);
if (fd < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open file %s; %s\n", \
name, strerror(errno));
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
opterr = 0;
while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "a:d:svh")) != EOF)
switch (c) {
case 'a':
add_arg = optarg;
add_entry(fd, name2uid(add_arg));
break;
case 'd':
del_arg = optarg;
del_entry(fd, name2uid(del_arg));
break;
case 's':
print_entries(fd);
break;
case 'v':
banner();
break;
case 'h':
usage(argv[0]);
break;
default :
fprintf(stderr, "%s: illegal option\n", argv[0]);
fprintf(stderr, "Try `%s -h' for more information\n", argv[0]);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
<-->
<++> EX/tpe-0.02/kernel-tpe-2.0.32.diff
diff -urN linux-2.0.32/Documentation/Configure.help linux/Documentation/Configure.help
--- linux-2.0.32/Documentation/Configure.help Sat Sep 6 05:43:58 1997
+++ linux/Documentation/Configure.help Sat Apr 11 21:30:40 1998
@@ -3338,6 +3338,27 @@
serial mice, modems and similar devices connecting to the standard
serial ports.
+Trusted path execution (EXPERIMENTAL)
+CONFIG_TPE
+ This option enables trusted path execution. Binaries are considered
+ `trusted` if they live in a root owned directory that is not group or
+ world writable. If an attempt is made to execute a program from a non
+ trusted directory, it will simply not be allowed to run. This is
+ quite useful on a multi-user system where security is an issue. Users
+ will not be able to compile and execute arbitrary programs (read: evil)
+ from their home directories, as these directories are not trusted.
+ A list of non-root users allowed to run binaries can be modified
+ by using program "tpadm". You should have received it with this
+ patch. If not please visit http://www.knm.org.pl/prezes/index.html,
+ mail the author - Krzysztof G. Baranowski <kgb@manjak.knm.org.pl>,
+ or write it itself :-). This driver has been written as an enhancement
+ to route's <route@infonexus.cm> original patch. (a check in do_execve()
+ in fs/exec.c for trusted directories, ie. root owned and not group/world
+ writable). This option is useless on a single user machine.
+ Logging of trusted path execution violation is configurable via /proc
+ filesystem and turned off by default, to turn it on run you must run:
+ "echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/tpe". To turn it off: "echo 0 > /proc/sys/..."
+
Digiboard PC/Xx Support
CONFIG_DIGI
This is a driver for the Digiboard PC/Xe, PC/Xi, and PC/Xeve cards
diff -urN linux-2.0.32/drivers/char/Config.in linux/drivers/char/Config.in
--- linux-2.0.32/drivers/char/Config.in Tue Aug 12 22:06:54 1997
+++ linux/drivers/char/Config.in Sat Apr 11 21:30:53 1998
@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@
comment 'Character devices'
tristate 'Standard/generic serial support' CONFIG_SERIAL
+if [ "$CONFIG_EXPERIMENTAL" = "y" ]; then
+ bool 'Trusted Path Execution (EXPERIMENTAL)' CONFIG_TPE
+fi
bool 'Digiboard PC/Xx Support' CONFIG_DIGI
tristate 'Cyclades async mux support' CONFIG_CYCLADES
bool 'Stallion multiport serial support' CONFIG_STALDRV
diff -urN linux-2.0.32/drivers/char/Makefile linux/drivers/char/Makefile
--- linux-2.0.32/drivers/char/Makefile Tue Aug 12 22:06:54 1997
+++ linux/drivers/char/Makefile Thu Apr 9 15:34:46 1998
@@ -34,6 +34,10 @@
endif
endif
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_TPE),y)
+L_OBJS += tpe.o
+endif
+
ifndef CONFIG_SUN_KEYBOARD
L_OBJS += keyboard.o defkeymap.o
endif
diff -urN linux-2.0.32/drivers/char/tpe.c linux/drivers/char/tpe.c
--- linux-2.0.32/drivers/char/tpe.c Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
+++ linux/drivers/char/tpe.c Sat Apr 11 22:06:36 1998
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+/*
+ * tpe.c - tpe driver
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 Krzysztof G. Baranowski. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This file is part of the Linux TPE Suite and is made available under
+ * the terms of the GNU General Public License, version 2, or at your
+ * option, any later version, incorporated herein by reference.
+ *
+ *
+ * Revision history:
+ *
+ * Revision 0.01: Thu Apr 6 18:31:55 CEST 1998
+ * Initial release for alpha testing.
+ * Revision 0.02: Sat Apr 11 21:32:33 CEST 1998
+ * Replaced CONFIG_TPE_LOG with sysctl option.
+ *
+ */
+
+static const char *version = "0.02";
+
+#include <linux/version.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/config.h>
+#include <linux/tpe.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+
+static const char *tpe_dev = "tpe";
+static unsigned int tpe_major = 40;
+static int tpe_users[MAX_USERS];
+int tpe_log = 0; /* sysctl boolean */
+
+#if 0
+static void print_report(const char *info)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+
+ printk("Report: %s\n", info);
+ while (i < MAX_USERS) {
+ printk("tpe_users[%d] = %d\n", i, tpe_users[i]);
+ i++;
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+static int is_on_list(int uid)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_USERS; i++) {
+ if (tpe_users[i] == uid)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int tpe_verify(unsigned short uid, struct inode *d_ino)
+{
+ if (((d_ino->i_mode & (S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH)) == 0) && (d_ino->i_uid == 0))
+ return 0;
+ if ((is_on_list(uid) == 0) && (d_ino->i_uid == uid) &&
+ (d_ino->i_mode & (S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH)) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (tpe_log)
+ security_alert("Trusted path execution violation");
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int tpe_find_entry(int uid)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+
+ while (tpe_users[i] != uid && i < MAX_USERS)
+ i++;
+ if (i >= MAX_USERS)
+ return -1;
+ else
+ return i;
+}
+
+static void tpe_revalidate(void)
+{
+ int temp[MAX_USERS];
+ int i, j = 0;
+
+ memset(temp, 0, sizeof(temp));
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_USERS; i++) {
+ if (tpe_users[i] != 0) {
+ temp[j] = tpe_users[i];
+ j++;
+ }
+ }
+ memset(tpe_users, 0, sizeof(tpe_users));
+ memcpy(tpe_users, temp, sizeof(temp));
+}
+
+static int add_entry(int uid)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (uid <= 0)
+ return -EBADF;
+ if (!is_on_list(uid))
+ return -EEXIST;
+ if ((i = tpe_find_entry(0)) != -1) {
+ tpe_users[i] = uid;
+ tpe_revalidate();
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ return -ENOSPC;
+}
+
+static int del_entry(int uid)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (uid <= 0)
+ return -EBADF;
+ if (is_on_list(uid))
+ return -EBADF;
+ i = tpe_find_entry(uid);
+ tpe_users[i] = 0;
+ tpe_revalidate();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tpe_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
+ unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+ int argc = (int) arg;
+ int retval;
+
+ if (!suser())
+ return -EPERM;
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case TPE_SCSETENT:
+ retval = add_entry(argc);
+ return retval;
+ case TPE_SCDELENT:
+ retval = del_entry(argc);
+ return retval;
+ case TPE_SCGETENT:
+ return tpe_users[argc];
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+}
+
+static int tpe_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void tpe_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ /* dummy */
+}
+
+static struct file_operations tpe_fops = {
+ NULL, /* llseek */
+ NULL, /* read */
+ NULL, /* write */
+ NULL, /* readdir */
+ NULL, /* select */
+ tpe_ioctl, /* ioctl*/
+ NULL, /* mmap */
+ tpe_open, /* open */
+ tpe_close, /* release */
+};
+
+int tpe_init(void)
+{
+ int result;
+
+ tpe_revalidate();
+ if ((result = register_chrdev(tpe_major, tpe_dev, &tpe_fops)) != 0)
+ return result;
+ printk(KERN_INFO "TPE %s subsystem initialized... "
+ "(C) 1998 Krzysztof G. Baranowski\n", version);
+ return 0;
+}
diff -urN linux-2.0.32/drivers/char/tty_io.c linux/drivers/char/tty_io.c
--- linux-2.0.32/drivers/char/tty_io.c Tue Sep 16 18:36:49 1997
+++ linux/drivers/char/tty_io.c Thu Apr 9 15:34:46 1998
@@ -2030,6 +2030,9 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_SERIAL
rs_init();
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_TPE
+ tpe_init();
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SCC
scc_init();
#endif
diff -urN linux-2.0.32/fs/exec.c linux/fs/exec.c
--- linux-2.0.32/fs/exec.c Fri Nov 7 18:57:30 1997
+++ linux/fs/exec.c Fri Apr 10 14:02:02 1998
@@ -47,6 +47,11 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_KERNELD
#include <linux/kerneld.h>
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_TPE
+extern int tpe_verify(unsigned short uid, struct inode *d_ino);
+extern int dir_namei(const char *pathname, int *namelen, const char **name,
+ struct inode *base, struct inode **res_inode);
+#endif
asmlinkage int sys_exit(int exit_code);
asmlinkage int sys_brk(unsigned long);
@@ -652,12 +657,29 @@
int do_execve(char * filename, char ** argv, char ** envp, struct pt_regs * regs)
{
struct linux_binprm bprm;
+ struct inode *dir;
+ const char *basename;
+ int namelen;
+
int retval;
int i;
bprm.p = PAGE_SIZE*MAX_ARG_PAGES-sizeof(void *);
for (i=0 ; i<MAX_ARG_PAGES ; i++) /* clear page-table */
bprm.page[i] = 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TPE
+ /* Check to make sure the path is trusted. If the directory is root
+ * owned and not group/world writable, it's trusted. Otherwise,
+ * return -EACCES and optionally log it
+ */
+ if (!suser()) {
+ dir_namei(filename, &namelen, &basename, NULL, &dir);
+ if (tpe_verify(current->uid, dir))
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_TPE */
+
retval = open_namei(filename, 0, 0, &bprm.inode, NULL);
if (retval)
return retval;
diff -urN linux-2.0.32/fs/namei.c linux/fs/namei.c
--- linux-2.0.32/fs/namei.c Sun Aug 17 01:23:19 1997
+++ linux/fs/namei.c Thu Apr 9 15:34:46 1998
@@ -216,8 +216,13 @@
* dir_namei() returns the inode of the directory of the
* specified name, and the name within that directory.
*/
+#ifdef CONFIG_TPE
+int dir_namei(const char *pathname, int *namelen, const char **name,
+ struct inode * base, struct inode **res_inode)
+#else
static int dir_namei(const char *pathname, int *namelen, const char **name,
struct inode * base, struct inode **res_inode)
+#endif /* CONFIG_TPE */
{
char c;
const char * thisname;
diff -urN linux-2.0.32/include/linux/sysctl.h linux/include/linux/sysctl.h
--- linux-2.0.32/include/linux/sysctl.h Tue Aug 12 23:06:35 1997
+++ linux/include/linux/sysctl.h Sat Apr 11 22:04:13 1998
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
#define KERN_NFSRADDRS 18 /* NFS root addresses */
#define KERN_JAVA_INTERPRETER 19 /* path to Java(tm) interpreter */
#define KERN_JAVA_APPLETVIEWER 20 /* path to Java(tm) appletviewer */
+#define KERN_TPE 21 /* TPE logging */
/* CTL_VM names: */
#define VM_SWAPCTL 1 /* struct: Set vm swapping control */
diff -urN linux-2.0.32/include/linux/tpe.h linux/include/linux/tpe.h
--- linux-2.0.32/include/linux/tpe.h Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
+++ linux/include/linux/tpe.h Thu Apr 9 15:34:46 1998
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/*
+ * tpe.h - misc common stuff
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 Krzysztof G. Baranowski. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This file is part of the Linux TPE Suite and is made available under
+ * the terms of the GNU General Public License, version 2, or at your
+ * option, any later version, incorporated herein by reference.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef __TPE_H__
+#define __TPE_H__
+
+#ifdef __KERNEL__
+/* Taken from Solar Designers' <solar@false.com> non executable stack patch */
+#define security_alert(msg) { \
+ static unsigned long warning_time = 0, no_flood_yet = 0; \
+\
+/* Make sure at least one minute passed since the last warning logged */ \
+ if (!warning_time || jiffies - warning_time > 60 * HZ) { \
+ warning_time = jiffies; no_flood_yet = 1; \
+ printk( \
+ KERN_ALERT \
+ "Possible " msg " exploit attempt:\n" \
+ KERN_ALERT \
+ "Process %s (pid %d, uid %d, euid %d).\n", \
+ current->comm, current->pid, \
+ current->uid, current->euid); \
+ } else if (no_flood_yet) { \
+ warning_time = jiffies; no_flood_yet = 0; \
+ printk( \
+ KERN_ALERT \
+ "More possible " msg " exploit attempts follow.\n"); \
+ } \
+}
+#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
+
+/* size of tpe_users array */
+#define MAX_USERS 32
+
+/* ioctl */
+#define TPE_SCSETENT 0x3137
+#define TPE_SCDELENT 0x3138
+#define TPE_SCGETENT 0x3139
+
+#endif /* __TPE_H__ */
diff -urN linux-2.0.32/include/linux/tty.h linux/include/linux/tty.h
--- linux-2.0.32/include/linux/tty.h Tue Nov 18 20:46:44 1997
+++ linux/include/linux/tty.h Sat Apr 11 21:45:20 1998
@@ -283,6 +283,7 @@
extern unsigned long con_init(unsigned long);
extern int rs_init(void);
+extern int tpe_init(void);
extern int lp_init(void);
extern int pty_init(void);
extern int tty_init(void);
diff -urN linux-2.0.32/kernel/sysctl.c linux/kernel/sysctl.c
--- linux-2.0.32/kernel/sysctl.c Thu Aug 14 00:02:42 1997
+++ linux/kernel/sysctl.c Sat Apr 11 21:40:03 1998
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@
/* External variables not in a header file. */
extern int panic_timeout;
+#ifdef CONFIG_TPE
+extern int tpe_log;
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ROOT_NFS
#include <linux/nfs_fs.h>
@@ -147,6 +150,10 @@
64, 0644, NULL, &proc_dostring, &sysctl_string },
{KERN_JAVA_APPLETVIEWER, "java-appletviewer", binfmt_java_appletviewer,
64, 0644, NULL, &proc_dostring, &sysctl_string },
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_TPE
+ {KERN_TPE, "tpe", &tpe_log, sizeof(int),
+ 0644, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
#endif
{0}
};
<-->
----[ EOF
